This profile configuration was introduced in V3.1 of this plugin. In older releases, it was implicitly part of the OIDC.SSO profile configuration and was not a separate feature.
File(s):conf/relying-party.xml, conf/oidc.properties Format: Native Spring, Spring Properties
The OAUTH2.Token profile configuration bean enables support for the OAUTH 2 Token endpoint, which implements the flow that supports OAuth token granting use cases, including OIDC-specific grant features in support of that particular use case.
In V3.1+ of the plugin, the behavior of the Authorization and Token endpoints has been optionally split into separate profile configurations, in order to support additional OAuth use cases specific to the token endpoint and to allow for more configuration flexibility. When this profile bean is absent, the presence of the OIDC.SSO profile configuration bean implies the OIDC-specific functionality of this endpoint is active with the settings configured on that bean. When present, it supersedes that behavior and directly configures all uses of the endpoint.
Configuration
The most typical options used are described in more detail below, but not every obscure option is discussed. See the javadoc for all of the possible configuration options for this profile (note that some of them are inherited from parent classes).
Virtually all the configuration options below can be set via two different properties: a static property that explicitly sets the value to use and a lookup strategy or predicate property that takes a Function or Predicate and returns the value to use. The dynamic property is generally named "propertyNamePredicate" or "propertyNameLookupStrategy" for Boolean- and non-Boolean-valued properties respectively.
The DPoP proof validation in the token endpoint is activated whenever any of the following conditions is true:
The incoming request contains a DPoP proof JWT
The use of DPoP proofs is required in the profile configuration (see requireDpopProof)
The RP metadata enforces the use of DPoP tokens (dpop_bound_access_tokens=true)
The valid DPoP proof means that the access token issued by this profile are DPoP tokens. This is signaled in the token type parameter in the response. The alwaysIssueBearerAccessToken option may be used to enforce the issuance of bearer access tokens. Public clients may want to solely bind the refresh tokens with the DPoP public key.
Options specific to generic or OAuth usage of the Token flow:
Name
Type
Default
Description
Name
Type
Default
Description
resolveAttributes
Boolean
true
Whether to resolve attributes during the token issuance process
grantTypes
Collection<String>
authorization_code, refresh_token
OAuth grant types to allow
accessTokenLifetime
Duration
PT10M
Lifetime of access token issued to client
If you customize this, make sure to set the revocation cache lifetime (See Replay and Revocation section later at this page) to at least this length of time. Also check refreshTokenTimeout and use whichever is longer.
refreshTokenLifetime
Duration
PT2H
Lifetime of refresh token issued to client (Deprecated since 3.4)
refreshTokenTimeout 3.4
Duration
PT2H
Lifetime of a single refresh token issued to client
If you customize this, make sure to set the revocation cache lifetime (See Replay and Revocation section later at this page) to at least this length of time. Also check accessTokenLifetime and use whichever is longer.
refreshTokenChainLifetime 3.4
Duration
PT2H
Lifetime of the chain of refresh tokens issued to client. The expiration instant is calculated by adding the lifetime to the end-user authentication instant.
forcePKCE
Boolean
false
Whether client is required to use PKCE
allowPKCEPlain
Boolean
false
Whether client is allowed to use PKCE code challenge method "plain"
accessTokenType 3.2
String
Format of access token. Supported values are “JWT” or nothing/empty/null, implying opaque tokens.
refreshTokenType 4.1
String
Format of refresh token. Supported values are “JWT” or nothing/empty/null, implying opaque tokens.
enforceRefreshTokenRotation 3.2
Boolean
false
Whether to enforce refresh token rotation. If enabled, the refresh token is revoked whenever it is used for issuing a new refresh token.
strictScopeValidation 4.2
Boolean
false
Whether to enable strict scope validation. If enabled, the request containing non-allowed (not registered for the registered clients or non-policy compliant for unregistered clients) scope values is considered as an error.
alwaysIssueBearerAccessToken 4.2
Boolean
false
Whether to issue bearer token even if the DPoP proof JWT was included in the request. With the public clients, this means that solely the refresh tokens will be bound to the DPoP proof’s public key.
Manipulation strategy for customising access token claims set contents. The BiFunction inputs are the ProfileRequestContext and the current contents of the claims set as a Map<String,Object>.
If the result is non-null, the result (Map<String,Object) is used to replace the contents of the claims set. It is the deployer’s responsibility to ensure the results remain valid/appropriate.
customRedirectUriValidationStrategy 4.2
BiPredicate<
URI,
ProfileRequestContext
>
null
Custom validation strategy for the redirect_uri parameter. If a value is set, it overrides the default validation logic for both registered and unregistered clients.
The following properties can be used to globally adjust some of the settings above (some of them affect other profiles as well).
idp.oauth2.grantTypes
idp.oidc.accessToken.defaultLifetime
idp.oidc.refreshToken.defaultLifetime (deprecated since v3.4)
Authorization codes are bearer tokens and have to be limited to a single use as a security measure. Reuse is monitored by storing reference values in the existing IdP replay cache that handles related SAML and CAS needs. It should be noted that the criticality of this cache to CAS and OIDC are generally much higher than for SAML (unless SAML artifacts are used), and the limitations of an in-memory cache that is not clustered across servers much more severe.
Reuse of an authorization code invalidates all tokens derived from it by tracking revoked codes. This is handled by another (obviously server-side) cache, the revocation cache.
Two properties are provided in conf/oidc.properties to control aspects of this process:
idp.oidc.revocationCache.authorizeCode.lifetime
Lifetime of entries stored in the revocation cache (covering the entire token chain), defaults to 6 hours.
Since V3.4, if the relying party has the revocation profile enabled, the lifetime is taken from the revocationLifetime profile configuration value (see OPRevocation | Configuration). By default, that value is taken from the idp.oidc.revocationCache.authorizeCode.lifetime property.
idp.oidc.revocationCache.StorageService
Bean ID of StorageService for revocation cache, requires server-side storage. Defaults to shibboleth.StorageService (in-memory).
Since V3.2, via support for revoking single tokens instead of the whole chain (see OPRevocation | Configuration), an attempt to use a revoked refresh token causes the whole chain derived from the single revoked token to be revoked. The lifetime for this revocation record is then taken from OPRevocation | Configuration.