OPAuthorization

File(s): conf/relying-party.xml, conf/oidc.properties
Format: Native Spring, Spring Properties

1 Overview
2 Configuration
3 Replay and Revocation

Overview

The OIDC.SSO profile configuration bean enables support for the OIDC Authorization and OAuth 2 Token endpoints, which includes the browser-based flow that actually issues token(s) and/or authorization codes to resolve into tokens, and the flow to resolve the codes. It has the most configurability compared to the other profiles since it includes both OIDC-related features and all the standard authentication-related controls/options supported by the IdP. Many of the authentication settings only apply to the Authorization half.

In V3.1+ of the plugin, the behavior of the Authorization and Token endpoints has been optionally split into separate profile configurations, in order to support additional OAuth use cases specific to the token endpoint and to allow for more configuration flexibility. For backward compatibility, the presence of this bean (the Authorization configuration) but the absence of the new Token configuration bean, implies enablement of the Token configuration with the options configured on this bean, supporting the previously supported OIDC grant types. In other words, by default nothing changes and no new features are involved. If the OAUTH2.Token bean is added in a RelyingParty definition, its presence supersedes this compatibility, and the behavior of the Token endpoint is controlled by the new bean.

Configuration

The most typical options used are described in more detail below, but not every obscure option is discussed. See the javadoc for all of the possible configuration options for this profile (note that some of them are inherited from parent classes).

Virtually all the configuration options below can be set via two different properties: a static property that explicitly sets the value to use and a lookup strategy or predicate property that takes a Function or Predicate and returns the value to use. The dynamic property is generally named "propertyNamePredicate" or "propertyNameLookupStrategy" for Boolean- and non-Boolean-valued properties respectively.

In V3.3+ of the plugin, the support for plain OAuth2 authorization requests can be controlled via idp.oauth2.requireAuthenticationRequestPredicate property. In order the default behaviour as before V3.3, the property value defaults to a predicate shibboleth.Conditions.TRUE, meaning that OIDC authentication requests are always required. One principal requirement for an OIDC authentication request is to include openid in the requested scopes. If the predicate is configured to return false, then non-OIDC requests are enabled. For these RPs, one must configure at least one audience in the RP metadata for controlling the target audience of the access tokens. See audience claim in OAuthRPMetadataProfile .

For convenience, this is also controllable globally via the idp.oidc.tokenEndpointAuthMethods property.

Options specific to the OIDC Authorization flow:

Name	Type	Default	Description

Name	Type	Default	Description
iDTokenLifetime	Duration	PT1H	Lifetime of ID token
accessTokenLifetime	Duration	PT10M	Lifetime of access token If you customise this, make sure to set the revocation cache lifetime (See Replay and Revocation -section later at this page) to at least match with this. Also check refreshTokenTimeout and use which ever is longer.
authorizeCodeLifetime	Duration	PT5M	Lifetime of authorization code
refreshTokenLifetime	Duration	PT2H	DEPRECATED Lifetime of refresh token
refreshTokenTimeout ^3.4	Duration	PT2H	Lifetime of a single refresh token issued to client, which acts as a timeout on the ability to refresh any tokens. If you customise this, make sure to set the revocation cache lifetime (See Replay and Revocation -section later at this page) to at least match with this. Also check accessTokenLifetime and use which ever is longer.
refreshTokenChainLifetime ^3.4	Duration	PT2H	Lifetime of the chain of refresh tokens issued to client. The expiration instant is calculated by adding the lifetime to the end user authentication instant.
additionalAudiencesForIdToken	Set<String>		Adds additional valid audiences for ID token. This feature does not involve any policy controls or features that may be added in the future to support issuing tokens to parties other than the OIDC client. It should be used with caution, and in most cases avoided.
acrRequestAlwaysEssential	Boolean	false	Whether to treat "acr" claim requests as essential regardless of request
forcePKCE	Boolean	false	Whether client is required to use PKCE
allowPKCEPlain	Boolean	false	Whether client is allowed to use PKCE code challenge method "plain"
encodedAttributes	Set<String>		Specifies IdPAttributes to encode into tokens for recovery on back-channel token requests
encodeConsentInTokens	Boolean	false	Whether to embed consent decision(s) in access/refresh tokens and authorization code to allow for client-side consent storage
alwaysIncludedAttributes	Set<String>		Specifies IdPAttributes to always include in ID token regardless of response_type
deniedUserInfoAttributes	Set<String>		Specifies IdPAttributes to omit from UserInfo token
accessTokenType^3.2	String		Format of access token. Supported values are “JWT” or nothing/empty/null, implying opaque tokens.
useRequestObject ^3.4	Boolean	false	Whether to enforce use of request objects
signRequestObject ^3.4	Boolean	true	Whether to enforce signing of request objects if they’re used.
encryptRequestObject ^3.4	Boolean	false	Whether to enforce encryption of request objects if they’re used.
responseModes ^4.1	Set<String°		Specifies allowed values for response_mode in the authorization/authentication requests. Null/empty means that all supported values are allowed.
requireAuthenticationRequest ^4.1	Boolean	true	Whether to enforce use of OIDC authentication sequence (involving `openid` scope). Note! In SAML metadata-driven configuration, only the use of `requireAuthenticationRequestPredicate` is supported.
requirePushedAuthorizationRequest ^4.2	Boolean	false	Whether to require the use of `OAUTH2.PAR` prior to the authorization/authentication request and thus include the `request_uri` value produced by it.
strictScopeValidation ^4.2	Boolean	false	Whether to enable strict scope validation. If enabled, the request containing non-allowed (not registered for the registered clients or non-policy compliant for unregistered clients) scope values is considered as an error.
requireDpopJkt ^4.2	Boolean	false	Whether to require the use of `dpop_jkt` -parameter. It’s the JWK Thumbprint of the proof-of-possession public key using the SHA-256 hash function.
includeIssuerInResponse ^3.2	Boolean	false	Whether to include issuer -parameter in the responses, as specified by RFC 9207. If set to true, also consider including `authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported` to the OP metadata.
IDTokenManipulationStrategy ^3.2	BiFunction< ProfileRequestContext, Map<String,Object>, Map<String,Object> >		Manipulation strategy for customising id_token contents. The BiFunction inputs are the ProfileRequestContext and the current contents of id_token as a Map<String,Object>. If the result is non-null, the result (Map<String,Object) is used to replace the contents of the id_token. It is the deployer’s responsibility to ensure the results remain valid/appropriate.
authorizationCodeClaimsSetManipulationStrategy ^3.2	BiFunction< ProfileRequestContext, Map<String,Object>, Map<String,Object> >		Manipulation strategy for customising authorization code claims set contents. The BiFunction inputs are the ProfileRequestContext and the current contents of the claims set as a Map<String,Object>. If the result is non-null, the result (Map<String,Object) is used to replace the contents of the claims set. It is the deployer’s responsibility to ensure the results remain valid/appropriate.
accessTokenClaimsSetManipulationStrategy ^3.2	BiFunction< ProfileRequestContext, Map<String,Object>, Map<String,Object> >		Manipulation strategy for customising access token claims set contents. The BiFunction inputs are the ProfileRequestContext and the current contents of the claims set as a Map<String,Object>. If the result is non-null, the result (Map<String,Object) is used to replace the contents of the claims set. It is the deployer’s responsibility to ensure the results remain valid/appropriate.
customRedirectUriValidationStrategy ^4.2	BiPredicate< URI, ProfileRequestContext >	null	Custom validation strategy for the redirect_uri parameter. If a value is set, it overrides the default validation logic for both registered and unregistered clients.

The following properties can be used to globally adjust some of the settings above (some of them affect other profiles as well).

idp.oidc.idToken.defaultLifetime
idp.oidc.accessToken.defaultLifetime
idp.oidc.authorizeCode.defaultLifetime
idp.oidc.refreshToken.defaultLifetime
idp.oidc.forcePKCE
idp.oidc.allowPKCEPlain
idp.oidc.encodedAttributes
idp.oidc.encodeConsentInTokens
idp.oidc.alwaysIncludedAttributes
idp.oidc.deniedUserInfoAttributes
idp.oauth2.requireAuthenticationRequestPredicate^3.3
idp.oidc.requestobject.used^3.4
idp.oidc.requestobject.signed^3.4
idp.oidc.requestobject.encrypted^3.4
idp.oauth2.responseModes^4.1
idp.oidc.strictScopeValidation^4.2

The encodedAttributes feature is discussed under OPAttributeResolution (see Timing of Resolution).

The final two options relate to "claims splitting" and override the typical processing rules for when to insert claims into particular tokens. Typically most "data" is omitted from the front-channel ID token unless no authorization code is being issued, with the claims only accessed via the UserInfo endpoint. These settings force claims into or out of those spots.

Replay and Revocation

Authorization codes are bearer tokens and have to be limited to a single use as a security measure. Reuse is monitored by storing reference values in the existing IdP replay cache that handles related SAML and CAS needs. It should be noted that the criticality of this cache to CAS and OIDC are generally much higher than for SAML (unless SAML artifacts are used), and the limitations of an in-memory cache that is not clustered across servers much more severe.

Reuse of an authorization code invalidates all tokens derived from it by tracking revoked codes. This is handled by another (obviously server-side) cache, the revocation cache.

Two properties are provided in conf/oidc.properties to control aspects of this process:

idp.oidc.revocationCache.authorizeCode.lifetime
- Lifetime for entries stored to revocation cache regarding whole token chains, defaults to 6 hours.
  - Since OP 3.4, if the relying party has the revocation profile enabled, the lifetime is taken from the revocationLifetime profile configuration value (see OPRevocation | Configuration). By default, its value is taken from the idp.oidc.revocationCache.authorizeCode.lifetime -property.
idp.oidc.revocationCache.StorageService
- Bean ID of StorageService for revocation cache, requires server-side storage. Defaults to shibboleth.StorageService (in-memory).