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The SAML2.ArtifactResolution profile configuration bean enables support for the SAML 2.0 Artifact Resolution profile over SOAP. It is required when supporting the use of the Artifact profile with Browser SSO in order to deliver the full assertion. It should be disabled if not in use.
Configuration
The most typical options used are described in more detail below, but not every obscure option is discussed. See the javadoc for all of the possible configuration options for this profile (note that many of them are inherited from parent classes).
Virtually all the configuration options below can be set via two different properties: a static property that explicitly sets the value to use and a lookup strategy or predicate property that takes a Function or Predicate and returns the value to use. The dynamic property is generally named "propertyNamePredicate" or "propertyNameLookupStrategy" for Boolean- and non-Boolean-valued properties respectively.
Bean named shibboleth.DefaultSecurityConfiguration
An object containing all of the default security-related objects needed for peer authentication and encryption. See SecurityConfiguration for complete details.
disallowedFeatures
Integer
0
A bitmask of features to disallow, the mask values being specific to individual profiles
inboundInterceptorFlows
List<String>
Ordered list of profile interceptor flows to run prior to message processing
outboundInterceptorFlows
List<String>
Ordered list of profile interceptor flows to run prior to outbound message handling
specify an alternate signing or decryption key to use
control signing or encryption algorithms (but for metadata you control, it's advisable to control algorithms by using an extension to specify supported algorithms).
The two interceptor lists allow the much less commonly used profile interceptor injection points to be used. This is largely a Java-based way of doing very low-level sorts of “message rewriting” hackery that might otherwise be impossible to pull off. One use case for the inbound side might be picking up non-standard parameters in a SAML request.
A function hook allowing modification of SAML messages before signing and transmission, useful for adding extensions
Guidance
It isn't too common to need any of these options, and they should be changed only with care.
The signing defaults vary by profile, see the notes on the individual profile pages.
Options common to SAML 2.0 profiles:
Name
Type
Default
Description
Name
Type
Default
Description
ignoreRequestSignatures
Boolean
false
Whether to skip validation of signatures on requests
encryptionOptional
Boolean
false
Whether to automatically disable encryption if the relying party does not possess a suitable key
encryptNameIDs
Boolean
varies by profile
Whether to encrypt NameIDs
Guidance
The encryption options are generally set correctly for each different profile; see the notes on the individual profile pages.
Note that when the conditions to encrypt various constructs evaluate to true, the IdP will fail the request if it is unable to perform the encryption, for whatever reason. This is overrideable using the encryptionOptional property, which allows the IdP to encrypt if it can but continue otherwise. If you carefully control your metadata sources, which you should do in any case, you should be able to trust that any SP lacking an encryption key is incapable of encryption anyway, making the property safe to enable.
The ignoreRequestSignatures option is an interoperability knob to deal with badly broken or incompetently operated services. Signed requests in some profiles, particularly SSO, are often pointless and are frequently used for no good reason. If the signer's code is broken, or even worse if they manage their key poorly and require constant flag days to update them, this allows the signature to be ignored and potentially the key to be bypassed so their incompetence doesn't impact your operations.
Name
Type
Default
Description
Name
Type
Default
Description
signAssertions
Boolean
false
Whether to sign assertions
encryptAssertions
Boolean
See Notes
Whether to encrypt assertions
encryptAttributes
Boolean
false
Whether to encrypt attributes
Notes
The default value of signResponses signs only if TLS isn't used (very unusual) or if the receiving port is 443. It assumes that traffic over 443 will be relying on message-based security measures, whereas traffic to an alternative TLS port like 8443 will be relying on mutual authentication and thus provide a secure channel.
The default value of encryptAssertions is conditional in the same manner.
If you need to enable the signAssertions option, and you control the SP's metadata, you should generally add the WantAssertionsSigned flag to it in place of using this option. Related, the idp.saml.honorWantAssertionsSigned property can be turned off to globally ignore that flag in metadata should you wish to do so.