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In V3.3+ of the plugin, the support for plain OAuth2 authorization requests can be controlled via idp.oauth2.requireAuthenticationRequestPredicate property. In order the default behaviour as before V3.3, the property value defaults to a predicate shibboleth.Conditions.TRUE, meaning that OIDC authentication requests are always required. One principal requirement for an OIDC authentication request is to include openid in the requested scopes. If the predicate is configured to return false, then non-OIDC requests are enabled. For these RPs, one must configure at least one audience in the RP metadata for controlling the target audience of the access tokens. See audience claim in OAuthRPMetadataProfile .

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titleCommon
Include Page

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OPProfileConfiguration-Common

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OPProfileConfiguration-Common
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titleAuthentication
Include Page
IDP4:ProfileConfiguration-Authentication
IDP4:ProfileConfiguration-Authentication
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titleFlow Types
Include Page
OPProfileConfiguration-FlowTypes
OPProfileConfiguration-FlowTypes
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titleClient Authentication
Include Page
OPProfileConfiguration-ClientAuthentication
OPProfileConfiguration-ClientAuthentication

For convenience, this is also controllable globally via the idp.oidc.tokenEndpointAuthMethods property.

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titleProfile-Specific

Options specific to the OIDC Authorization flow:

Name

Type

Default

Description

iDTokenLifetime

Duration

PT1H

Lifetime of ID token

accessTokenLifetime

Duration

PT10M

Lifetime of access token

If you customise this, make sure to set the revocation cache lifetime (See Replay and Revocation -section later at this page) to at least match with this. Also check refreshTokenTimeout and use which ever is longer.

authorizeCodeLifetime

Duration

PT5M

Lifetime of authorization code

refreshTokenLifetime

Duration

PT2H

DEPRECATED

Lifetime of refresh token

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refreshTokenTimeout 3.4

Duration

PT2H

Lifetime of a single refresh token issued to client, which acts as a timeout on the ability to refresh any tokens.

If you customise this, make sure to set the revocation cache lifetime (See Replay and Revocation -section later at this page) to at least match with this. Also check accessTokenLifetime and use which ever is longer.

refreshTokenChainLifetime 3.4

Duration

PT2H

Lifetime of the chain of refresh tokens issued to client. The expiration instant is calculated by adding the lifetime to the end user authentication instant.

additionalAudiencesForIdToken

Set<String>

Adds additional valid audiences for ID token. This feature does not involve any policy controls or features that may be added in the future to support issuing tokens to parties other than the OIDC client. It should be used with caution, and in most cases avoided.

acrRequestAlwaysEssential

Boolean

false

Whether to treat "acr" claim requests as essential regardless of request

forcePKCE

Boolean

false

Whether client is required to use PKCE

allowPKCEPlain

Boolean

false

Whether client is allowed to use PKCE code challenge method "plain"

encodedAttributes

Set<String>

Specifies IdPAttributes to encode into tokens for recovery on back-channel token requests

encodeConsentInTokens

Boolean

false

Whether to embed consent decision(s) in access/refresh tokens and authorization code to allow for client-side consent storage

alwaysIncludedAttributes

Set<String>

Specifies IdPAttributes to always include in ID token regardless of response_type

deniedUserInfoAttributes

Set<String>

Specifies IdPAttributes to omit from UserInfo token

accessTokenType3.2

String

 

Format of access token. Supported values are “JWT” or nothing/empty/null, implying opaque tokens.

useRequestObject 3.4

Boolean

false

Whether to enforce use of request objects

signRequestObject 3.4

Boolean

true

Whether to enforce signing of request objects if they’re used.

encryptRequestObject 3.4

Boolean

false

Whether to enforce encryption of request objects if they’re used.

responseModes 4.1

Set<String°

Specifies allowed values for response_mode in the authorization/authentication requests. Null/empty means that all supported values are allowed.

requireAuthenticationRequest 4.1

Boolean

true

Whether to enforce use of OIDC authentication sequence (involving openid scope).

Note! In SAML metadata-driven configuration, only the use of requireAuthenticationRequestPredicate is supported.

requirePushedAuthorizationRequest 4.2

Boolean

false

Whether to require the use of OAUTH2.PAR prior to the authorization/authentication request and thus include the request_uri value produced by it.

strictScopeValidation 4.2

Boolean

false

Whether to enable strict scope validation. If enabled, the request containing non-allowed (not registered for the registered clients or non-policy compliant for unregistered clients) scope values is considered as an error.

requireDpopJkt 4.2

Boolean

false

Whether to require the use of dpop_jkt -parameter. It’s the JWK Thumbprint of the proof-of-possession public key using the SHA-256 hash function.

includeIssuerInResponse 3.2

Boolean

false

Whether to include issuer -parameter in the responses, as specified by RFC 9207. If set to true, also consider including authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported to the OP metadata.

IDTokenManipulationStrategy 3.2

BiFunction<
ProfileRequestContext,
Map<String,Object>,
Map<String,Object>
>

Manipulation strategy for customising id_token contents. The BiFunction inputs are the ProfileRequestContext and the current contents of id_token as a Map<String,Object>.

If the result is non-null, the result (Map<String,Object) is used to replace the contents of the id_token. It is the deployer’s responsibility to ensure the results remain valid/appropriate.

authorizationCodeClaimsSetManipulationStrategy 3.2

BiFunction<
ProfileRequestContext,
Map<String,Object>,
Map<String,Object>
>

 

Manipulation strategy for customising authorization code claims set contents. The BiFunction inputs are the ProfileRequestContext and the current contents of the claims set as a Map<String,Object>.

If the result is non-null, the result (Map<String,Object) is used to replace the contents of the claims set. It is the deployer’s responsibility to ensure the results remain valid/appropriate. 

accessTokenClaimsSetManipulationStrategy 3.2

BiFunction<
ProfileRequestContext,
Map<String,Object>,
Map<String,Object>
>

Manipulation strategy for customising access token claims set contents. The BiFunction inputs are the ProfileRequestContext and the current contents of the claims set as a Map<String,Object>.

If the result is non-null, the result (Map<String,Object) is used to replace the contents of the claims set. It is the deployer’s responsibility to ensure the results remain valid/appropriate.

customRedirectUriValidationStrategy 4.2

BiPredicate<

URI,

ProfileRequestContext

>

null

Custom validation strategy for the redirect_uri parameter. If a value is set, it overrides the default validation logic for both registered and unregistered clients.

The following properties can be used to globally adjust some of the settings above (some of them affect other profiles as well).

  • idp.oidc.idToken.defaultLifetime

  • idp.oidc.accessToken.defaultLifetime

  • idp.oidc.authorizeCode.defaultLifetime

  • idp.oidc.refreshToken.defaultLifetime

  • idp.oidc.forcePKCE

  • idp.oidc.allowPKCEPlain

  • idp.oidc.encodedAttributes

  • idp.oidc.encodeConsentInTokens

  • idp.oidc.alwaysIncludedAttributes

  • idp.oidc.deniedUserInfoAttributes

  • idp.oauth2.requireAuthenticationRequestPredicate3.3

  • idp.oidc.requestobject.used3.4

  • idp.oidc.requestobject.signed3.4

  • idp.oidc.requestobject.encrypted3.4

  • idp.oauth2.responseModes4.1

  • idp.oidc.strictScopeValidation4.2

The encodedAttributes feature is discussed under OPAttributeResolution (see Timing of Resolution).

The final two options relate to "claims splitting" and override the typical processing rules for when to insert claims into particular tokens. Typically most "data" is omitted from the front-channel ID token unless no authorization code is being issued, with the claims only accessed via the UserInfo endpoint. These settings force claims into or out of those spots.

Replay and Revocation

Authorization codes are bearer tokens and have to be limited to a single use as a security measure. Reuse is monitored by storing reference values in the existing IdP replay cache that handles related SAML and CAS needs. It should be noted that the criticality of this cache to CAS and OIDC are generally much higher than for SAML (unless SAML artifacts are used), and the limitations of an in-memory cache that is not clustered across servers much more severe.

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