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Required, this is the SP's entityID, the SAML identifier that uniquely names an SP. IdPs do not have visibility into any internal application boundaries of an SP deployment. Any external distinctions must be noted by assigning a different entityID, which can be done on a content-specific basis via the entityIDSelf content setting.

References a policy defined via a <SecurityPolicies> element. When omitted, the default policy is assumed.

When true, the SP will refuse to decrypt assertions that are unprotected by a signature or an authenticated transport (e.g., back-channel TLS) unless the data is encrypted with a special type of algorithm that includes built-in integrity protection to prevent chosen ciphertext attacks. At the present time, this will generally block use of encryption unless signed responses are enabled by an IdP.

Normally, the set of possible headers that might be used to carry attributes is determined by querying the configured attribute extractor(s). This allows the list to be overridden. Not typically used.

If set, attributes extracted from metadata have their IDs prefixed with this value. Allows applications to distinguish between attributes about the user and attributes about the user's identity provider in the odd case that they might overlap.

Specifies the transport-layer authentication mechanism that is used for back-channel SOAP messages to an IdP. The values permitted are implementation dependent, but may include:

Controls outbound signing of XML messages. See the Signing and Encryption topic.

An XML Signature signature algorithm specifier for signatures produced by the SP

An XML Signature digest algorithm specifier for signatures produced by the SP

Controls outbound encryption of XML messages and content. See the Signing and Encryption topic.

An XML Encryption key wrap/transport algorithm specifier for encryption performed by the SP. The actual symmetric encryption algorithm will be derived from it.

Directly configures the TLS ciphers to support when making SOAP connections. The default value (ALL:!aNULL:!LOW:!EXPORT:!RC4:!SSLv2) is historical and has been in place for a few releases, and has been left alone to prevent upgrades from affecting interoperability. A stronger value is now used in the default files distributed with the software, which was derived from Mozilla's tool.

Specifies a particular credential to use for signing or TLS authentication by attaching a name to the lookup criteria passed to the credential resolver in use. Typically the credential resolver will be able to attach names or aliases to credentials in some fashion. For more on using this feature, see the Multiple Credentials topic.

Identifies which <ArtifactResolutionService> handler at the SP is used when sending artifact-bound messages to the relying party. Endpoints typically include an index attribute to copy here.

Controls the use of chunked encoding during back-channel SOAP communication. HTTP clients sending data must either compute and send a Content-Length header to the server (requiring that all data be buffered ahead of time), or use chunked encoding. A lot of servers mis-handle this option, so it is disabled by default.

Specifies the timeout for connecting to remote servers during back-channel SOAP communication.

When true, the SP will require the use of TLS/SSL for all back-channel SOAP communication. This prevents an unsafe exchange of data before an unencrypted channel might be used, since XML encryption depends on the peer's willingness to use it.

When true, assertions MUST be digitally signed, regardless of any other signatures used to authenticate them. Typically needed only for advanced auditing or assertion forwarding use cases.

Specifies a location to send the client after a session has been created (i.e., after login), but before transferring the client to the eventual final resource. This is normally a relative path to ensure that the session will be visible to the hook script, but doesn't have to be. A hook can be used to validate something about the session to check its "fitness for purpose" before delivering the client to an application that may not offer sufficient error handling capability to do the job itself. A common example is checking for required attributes. The hook redirect will include two parameters, target and return. The target parameter contains the resource URL that will eventually be the client's destination, in case the hook cares. The return parameter is the location to redirect the client back to upon completion of the hook.

The hook MUST either redirect back or take complete ownership of the client with no further processing by the SP.

Supplies values for the SAML 2.0 <AuthnContextClassRef> element in requests to applicable IdPs, or for the wauth parameter in WS-Federation requests. Ignored for other protocols.

Supplies values for the <RequestedAuthenticationContext> comparison operator in SAML 2.0 requests to applicable IdPs. Ignored for other protocols.

Supplies a value for the <NameIDPolicy> element's Format attribute in SAML 2.0 requests to applicable IdPs. Ignored for other protocols.

Supplies a value for the <NameIDPolicy> element's SPNameQualifier attribute in SAML 2.0 requests to applicable IdPs. Ignored for other protocols.